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ABSTRACT 
“Were the Court to leave the world, the world would continue 
without our participation,” 1 writes Justice Breyer to explain that global 
constitutionalism will survive regardless of the more or less isolationist 
role that the US Supreme Court chooses for itself. In an era of 
increasing relevance of international treaties, Breyer explains, the 
Supreme Court has acquired a deeper knowledge of other legal systems 
and its judges welcome exchanges with foreign judges, bar associations 
and students.2 The parallel with the US context is that even if the 
United Kingdom leaves the EU and “Brexit means Brexit,” in its harder 
or softer version, its domestic courts will not become secluded nor 
change their judicial style as soon as a new Treaty between the UK and 
the EU is concluded. Similarly, the transnational judicial style of the 
Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) interpreting European law is 
unlikely to change because of Brexit. The influences of EU law on UK 
law and vice-versa will endure. If French remains the working language 
of the Court of Justice, there is no doubt among lawyers and judges that 
English will remain the most common spoken language for working at 
or with the Court. So even if the Luxembourg judicial style will not 
change much more than it already did in incorporating a common law 
jurisdiction in its predominantly continental legal style, the biggest 
consequence of Brexit is the end of flux of preliminary references 
coming from the UK lower courts to Luxembourg.3 Since 1973 the 
judicial dialogue between UK courts and Luxembourg has transformed 
the judicial hierarchy and the legal practice of domestic courts. 
Terminating the “direct” jurisdiction4 of the CJEU on UK courts, as 
Prime Minister Theresa May has forcibly demanded, will not end the 
more indirect influence of EU law on UK courts and its lawyers.   
                                                                                                                                     
1. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW 
GLOBAL REALITIES 245 (2015). 
2. Id. at ch. 11. 
3. See Takis Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s Door: Fragmentation, Efficiency and 
Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, 40 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 9, 36 
(2003). 
4. See Britain cannot escape the long arm of European Law, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 26, 
2017), https://www.economist.com/news/britain/21727039-though-government-may-pretend-
otherwise-european-court-justice-will-have-role-after. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
While being initially sui generis, the judicial style of the European 
Court of Justice (“CJEU”) has become increasingly relevant within and 
beyond EU borders as a transnational adjudication model for global 
constitutionalism. 5  Since the adoption of the Nice Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, bound to mark the beginning of a new European 
era, scholars have appraised the Luxembourg style for its low judicial 
transparency due to its per curiam deliberations compared to other 
transnational courts.6  For instance in defying the practice of citing 
foreign judgments the CJEU appeared timid vis à vis the rest of the 
world, especially when compared to its regional counterpart, the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.7 
In the aftermath of the many European crises, however, the 
Luxembourg judicial style has become more visible due to a number of 
different factors including the expansion of EU competences on which 
the CJEU should give its uniform interpretation, the reduction of its 
enormous docket due to its efficient distribution of workload among its 
two courts, and its less formalist yet eclectic legal reasoning coupled 
by a less convoluted but still minimalist style. For instance, the Court’s 
jurisprudence interpreting human rights regimes and international trade 
agreements have important global implications beyond EU borders. In 
addition, its judicial dialogue with national courts and their resistance 
to Luxembourg’s primacy have become part of a unique European legal 
space.8 In short, all eyes are on Luxembourg and its dialogue with 
domestic, constitutional and international courts.9 
Since its accession to the European Economic Community in 
1973, UK judges, lawyers and legal scholars over time have 
                                                                                                                                     
5. Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 INDIANA J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 397, 397-98 (2009) (“Global constitutionalism is an academic and political agenda that 
identifies and advocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the international 
legal sphere in order to improve the effectiveness and the fairness of the international legal 
order.”). 
6. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, AMERICAN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2017) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2955172). 
7 . See Christopher McCrudden, Using Comparative Reasoning in Human Rights 
Adjudication: The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human 
Rights Compared, 15 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 383 (2013). 
8 . See ARMIN VON BOGDANDY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF EUROPEAN LAW: THE 
REFORMED CONCEPT AND ITS QUEST FOR COMPARISON (Max Planck Institute for Comparative 
Public Law & International Law, 2016). 
9. See Koen Lenaerts, La Vie Après L’avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not 
Blind) Trust, 54 COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW 805, 805–840 (2017). 
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contributed through its common law traditions to influence the legal 
reasoning and the judicial style of the CJEU. By the same token, UK 
legal elites and, in particular, judges have continued to adapt or resist 
the Luxembourg judicial style back home. Several scholars have 
explained how UK courts had to adapt to the Community legal order 
with its new judicial architecture and legal reasoning without knowing 
how they would become an integral part of it. 10  While judicial 
adaptation happened through the inclusion of doctrines such as 
proportionality and legitimate expectation, for instance, in UK 
administrative law, 11  some judges remained faithful to a more 
formalist interpretation of statutes more in tune with the parliamentary 
sovereignty tradition as a way to resist the primacy of EU law and 
maintain the British tradition challenge by the “incoming tide” of the 
EU Treaty. 
The central legal fiction in the post-accession legal order was that 
Community law was only directly applicable in national law through 
the European Communities Act adopted by the UK Parliament in 1972. 
This fiction allowed maintaining the centrality of parliamentary 
sovereignty while taming the fear of a necessary erosion of sovereignty 
expressed especially by politicians in the Labor Party. 12  Without 
departing from the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, UK courts 
were now asked to review and possibly set aside the Westminster’s 
laws when incompatible with Community law. In doing so, national 
judges were given broad discretion to interpret or refer to Luxembourg 
domestic laws. 13  Not all UK judges were able to exercise such 
discretion and instead they expressed their resistance to primacy of EU 
law by setting aside incompatible national law recognizing, but at the 
same time, reinstating, the hierarchy of parliamentary sovereignty in 
the UK legal order. 14 
With the UK exodus from the EU, there is some questioning 
among lawyers about whether the Luxembourg style will continue and 
                                                                                                                                     
10. See John Bridge, National Legal Tradition and the Common Law: Legislative Drafting 
and Juridical Interpretation in England and the European Community, 19 J. OF COMMON MKT. 
STUD. 351, 353 (1981). 
11. See Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 AM. J. 
OF COMPARATIVE L. 347, 375 (1994). 
12. See Labor and Common Market, Report on the Exchange with UK Lawyers in 1962 
at 51 (on file with author). 
13. See Simmenthal S.P.A. v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze pello Stato, Case 106/77, 
1978 E.C.R. I-0629. 
14. Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, 195 EWHC Admin (2002), ¶ 67. 
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the English will remain a language of wide use, together with French, 
among judges, référendaires and lawyers linguists as well as those 
solicitors and barristers litigating the many riddles of EU law in 
Luxembourg. However, little attention has been given to how the repeal 
of the European Communities Act by the Great Repeal Bill impacts 
domestic courts and their institutional functions.15 In the aftermath of 
the Miller judgment, EU law as held by the Supreme Court “through 
the conduit pipe”16  of the European Communities Act, remains an 
integral part of the UK legal system from which domestic courts might 
find it hard to disentangle. The more interesting question would be how 
post-Brexit the national court will treat the CJEU case law ranging from 
precedent, persuasive or no authority whatsoever. 17  The harder 
question though is whether once precluded from making preliminary 
references and setting aside national law, British courts will return 
quietly to their pre-accession style rather than exercising the extensive 
power of judicial review on legislative and executive acts they enjoyed 
in the EU judicial space. As some have noticed, however, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 may well also empower the courts in a similar way, 
though here all the courts can do is declare national law incompatible 
with the HRA 98 and not display it as in EU Law.18 
This contribution will proceed by first showing the relevance of 
the Luxembourg judicial style in global constitutionalism. The UK 
influence through its judges, advocate generals and lawyers 
participating to the process of “Europeanization of domestic law” has 
changed and added common law features to the CJEU style. Then I will 
address in four Acts the Brexit drama in the complex interplay between 
Community and UK law. Even though the drama over Brexit has been 
                                                                                                                                     
15. Thomas Horsley, Brexit and UK Courts: Awaiting Fresh Instruction, in THE UK 
AFTER BREXIT LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES 74 (Michael Dougan ed.)(July 2017). 
16. Jeffery Miller, A View from the Trenches: Lessons from Coleman v. Attridge Law 
(May 9, 2017) (unpublished dissertation, European University Institute) (on file with author). 
17. See The Government’s Negotiating Objectives, House of Commons White Paper, HC 
1125, at ¶ 30 (4 April 2017) https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/
cmexeu/1125/1125.pdf (“Once the European Communities Act 1972 is repealed, UK courts will 
no longer be bound by decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). . . . 
[h]owever, the extent to which UK courts continue to take account of CJEU case law remains to 
be decided.”). 
18 . See generally RICHARD GORDON QC AND ROWENA MOFFATT, BREXIT: THE 
IMMEDIATE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES 30-31 (2016). Gratitude and credit to Giorgio Monti 
for this contribution. 
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described in either six or three acts by prominent EU Law academics,19 
the focus on the Luxembourg judicial style and the “legal irritation”20 
of the UK legal profession having to adjust to EU law and the 
interpretation of the Court of Justice has not been central to this debate. 
This is evident from the documents of the Commission’s Legal Service 
many showing that lawyers and the Commission’s civil servants had, 
since 1962, found several elements for legal irritation in the clash 
between different methods of statutory interpretation and in the new 
judicial architecture that through the preliminary ruling allowed UK 
court to refer cases directly to the Court of Justice. This created a 
dangerous liaison outside the scope of the darling parliamentary 
sovereignty tradition in the United Kingdom.   
In Act I this article shows the concerns lawyers and the 
Commission had on reconciling the UK with the Community legal 
system since the early 1960s. In relying on archival materials from both 
the Commission’s legal services files as well as in the Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson’s speeches it becomes clear that the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty plays a central role to the UK accession to 
the EEC. Act II shows how the acceptance of and resistance to 
European law happened among British high Court judges in the 1970s. 
Act III explains how later in time the preliminary reference to 
Luxembourg allowed domestic courts to maintain their a textualist 
interpretation of the CJEU decisions and repeal UK law without 
departing from parliamentary democracy. In Act IV the Miller 
judgment by the Supreme Court reappraises how parliamentary 
supremacy was reconciled with the primacy of EU law in a UK dualist 
legal system without really focusing on oddity of the existence of a 
preliminary ruling mechanism. In conclusion, after this four act drama, 
the Luxembourg judicial style might not change much yet Brexit will 
create more turmoil within UK courts. These will have the hard task to 
operationalize the international Treaty that will be in place within the 
short timeframe of Art. 50 TEU but this time without the possibility of 
referring questions on its interpretation to Luxembourg. 
                                                                                                                                     
19. See Paul Craig, Brexit – A Drama in Six Acts 41 EL REV. 447 (2016); Tamara Ćapeta, 
Brexit and the EU constitutional order: a Three Act Tragedy 42 Croatian Yearbook of European 
Law and Policy 1 (2016). 
20. See Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying 
Law Ends Up in New Differences, 61 MODERN LAW REVIEW 11, 11-32 (1998). 
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II. GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND LUXEMBOURG 
JUDICIAL STYLE: FROM OUTDATED TO DIPLOMATIC? 
The constitutional debate on the use of foreign law and practice in 
domestic courts remains a hotly contested issue, especially so in a 
Trump-Brexit era when the reaffirmation of national sovereignty 
through the rise of extremist values and political and economic 
introspection are in the ascendency. Famously, just over a decade ago, 
Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia debated the use of foreign 
law by the Supreme Court of the United States,21 with Scalia’s more 
insular approach seemingly winning the day, despite the opposing 
preferences of other Justices, such as Breyer, Ginsburg 22  and 
Kennedy.23 Since then, Justice Breyer has restated the case for the 
judge to also be a “diplomat” and to learn from foreign legal ideas, for 
instance the European constitutional concept of proportionality when 
adjudicating on the First Amendment.24 
The CJEU has resisted to the use of foreign legal citations when 
these do not arise from the common legal traditions of its 28 Member 
states and with the increasing relevance of the cross citation of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence that creates a sort of cross-pollination. 25 Given 
nature of its transactional jurisdiction vis-à-vis twenty-eight EU 
member states the foreign influence remains relevant to the Court but 
in a rather indirect manner.26 For instance no direct citation to the 
United States Supreme Court appears from the judgments of the CJEU 
even though the opinions of its advocates general sparsely cite the U.S. 
jurisprudence.27 This is in sharp contrast from its regional counterpart, 
the European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg that openly 
cites in its decisions the judgments of other constitutional and 
                                                                                                                                     
21. Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional 
Cases: A Conversation Between Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 519-531 (October 1, 2005). 
22. Lyle Denniston, Ginsburg on Kagan and Foreign Law, SCOTUS BLOG (July 30th, 
2010l, 6:19 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/07/ginsburg-on-kagan-and-foreign-law/. 
23. Roper v. Simmons 125 U.S. 1183 (2005) (plurality opinion) 
24. Breyer, supra note 1, at ch.15. 
25. See McCrudden, supra note 7; Siniša Rodin, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign 
Court Decisions, 64 AM. J. COMPARATIVE L. 815, 815-840 (2016); GÁBOR HALMAI, THE USE 
OF FOREIGN LAW IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1328-48 (M. Rosenfeld & A. Sajó 
eds., 2012). 
26. See Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, The Comparative Law Method And The 
European Court Of Justice: Echoes Across The Atlantic, 64 AM. J. OF COMPARATIVE L. 841 
(2016). 
27. Refer to AG Saggio and AG Jacobs. 
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international courts.28 Due to the self-restraint of the CJEU, looking 
into citations might not be the best way to assess the influences coming 
from foreign courts and vice-versa. Rather, as suggested by Justice 
Breyer, there are ways to encourage judicial diplomacy by exchanging 
views that will influence the legal reasoning of the judges in 
understanding how the CJEU has used the doctrine of proportionality 
to enhance precision and transparency in their judgments29 and created 
the primacy of EU law on domestic law even though national courts 
retain their final word on it.30 
Scholars of global constitutionalism have assessed how 
constitutional law making is increasingly relevant in an international 
context and in particular through the lenses of transnational dialogue 
among domestic and supranational courts,31 through the concept of 
migration of constitutional ideas, 32  and the notion that judicial 
comparativism can be a form of judicial diplomacy. 33  Scholars of 
global constitutionalism seek to highlight how courts are in permanent 
dialogue with foreign judges, international members of the bar and 
even students of law so that some of these exchanges of ideas might 
end up influencing the constant evolution of judicial lawmaking.34 
In this context, the CJEU’s opaque and meticulous judicial style 
has been criticized by commentators for its lack of transparency and 
consistency, characterized by the secrecy of its deliberations and 
informal procedures.35 In the 1960s, the judicial style of the Court was 
clearly embedded in different civil law traditions, as its German, 
                                                                                                                                     
28. See Oliari and Others v. Italy, App. No. 18766/11, 36030/11 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 4 (2015). 
29. Breyer, supra note 1, at 262. 
30. Id. at 245. 
31. See Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational 
Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L. J. 487 (2005) (cited 
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in his concurring opinion in Kansas v. Marsh, 
126 S.Ct. 2516 (2006)). 
32. SUJIT CHOUDHRY, THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (2008). 
33. David Law, Judicial Comparativism and Judicial Diplomacy, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 
927 (2015). 
34 . RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Ch. 4-6 (2014); but see, Armin von Bogdandy, Comparative 
Constitutional Law As a Social Science? A Hegelian Reaction to Ran Hirschl’s Comparative 
Matters, MAX PLANCK INST. COMP. PUB. L. & INT’L L. (2016). 
35 . See Alberto Alemanno & Oana Stefan, Openness at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Toppling a Taboo, 51 COMMON MKT L. REV. 97 (2014); Angela Huyue 
Zhang, The Faceless Court, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 71 (2016); J.H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Judging 
the Judges – Apology and Critique, in JUDGING EUROPE’S JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE 
CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 235 (Maurice Adams et. al., eds., 2013). 
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French, Italian, and Benelux judges’ Romano-Germanic traditions 
were the predominant legal culture among judges. In the best civil law 
tradition, judges should have been mere interpreters of the EEC Treaty 
and write their judgments in a succinct and overly structured fashion. 
By the same token, their succinct style, allowed them to exercise more 
discretion in interpreting the gaps, conflict and ambiguities in the 
Treaty than common law judges. In fact, when it came to follow or 
overrule their precedents, without saying so, continental judges used 
teleological interpretation subverting the classic international law 
interpretative method.36 
From 1973 onwards civil lawyers were no longer the prominent 
legal tradition in the CJEU and the EEC accession of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark brought significant new judicial styles 
to Luxembourg. In particular, several authors highlighted how, initially 
modeled on the French Conseil d’Etat, the Court shifted to more 
eclectic style in interpretation ranging from the use of civilian general 
principles to common law tools such as stare decisis and an 
argumentative style driven by policy considerations. 37  As Justice 
David Edwards explained the civil law tradition provided a strategic 
tool to judge-made law requiring fewer justifications: “Perhaps the 
Court has brought an apparently “civilian” approach to bear simply 
because it is a sensible way to think about law, which neither 
consciously nor unconsciously reflects the civilian upbringing of most 
of the judges.”38 What is important to highlight, is that common law 
discursive style, however, was more formalist than its civil law 
counterpart with respect to statutory interpretation. In this realm UK 
judges who were not interpreting the common law rules based on 
precedents but rather Parliamentary acts, expressing the will of 
Westminster, had much less discretion that its civilian counterparts to 
depart from the literal or plain meaning of the statutes. 
                                                                                                                                     
36. See Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen, Case 26/62, 1963 
E.C.R. I-2 (in which the ECJ subverts the order of Treaty interpretation starting from the goal 
rather than the textual meaning of its words). 
37. See Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice. A Jurisprudence of Doubt?, 
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307, 308 (Julie Dickson et. al. 
eds. 2012); MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY 203 (2004). 
38. See David Edward, The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the Work of 
the European Court of Justice, in THE CIVILIAN TRADITION AND SCOTS LAW: ABERDEEN 
QUINCENTENARY ESSAYS at 14 (D.L. Carey Miller et. al., eds. 1997). 
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In Weiler and De Búrca’s edited volume, appraising the Court’s 
new judicial architecture après Nice,39 the amount of scholarly work 
focusing on the CJEU increased exponentially. There was then, and in 
part continues nowadays, a common howling regarding the 
Luxembourg judicial style that, despite its increasing prominence and 
relevance in Europe, received relatively little scholarly attention 
outside the EU or globally.40 Some scholars remain unhappy with the 
lack of transparency in the Court’s decisions that takes away from its 
clarity in judicial reasoning. This quest for transparency remains 
unsatisfied for those who point at the lack of dissenting and concurring 
opinions,41 and the non-explicit use of comparative legal sources on 
which the Court relies.42 
Thus, Luxembourg’s outmoded flair, mostly derived from the 
continental “cryptic, Cartesian style” 43  should be abandoned, 
according to Weiler, in favor of a “more discursive, analytic and 
conversational style associated with the common law world.”44  To 
Weiler the civil law style does not serve the needs of constitutionalism 
because: “[it] is not a basis of confidence-building European 
constitutional relations between the European Court and its national 
constitutional counterparts.”45 On the one hand, this statement is a 
premonition of the current primacy epics such as Gauweiler,46 Ajos47 
and Taricco48 characterized by the resistance of national constitutional 
courts. In all these cases constitutional law scholars have criticized the 
cryptic style of the CJEU and its indifference to the legal national 
                                                                                                                                     
39. Weiler, supra note 34. 
40. See Daniela Caruso, European Union Law in U.S. Legal Academia, 20 TUL. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 175 (2011). 
41. See V.F. Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 307 (2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, International Judicial Dissent: Causes and 
Consequences (2015), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/84 (unfinished draft 
paper prepared for presentation at the European Union Studies Association Biennial Conference, 
Mar. 5–7, 2015). 
42. Gráinne de Búrca, After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice 
as a Human Rights Adjudicator?, 20 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 168 (2013); McCrudden, 
supra note 7. 
43. Weiler, supra note 34. 
44. Id. at 219. 
45. Id. 
46. Gauweiler and Others, Case C-62/14, EU:C:2015:400 [2015]. 
47. Dansk Industri v. Rasmussen, Case C-441/14, EU:C:2016:278 [2016]. 
48. Taricco and Others, Case C 105/14, EU:C:2015:555 [2015]. 
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traditions.49 On the other hand, Weiler’s statement is limited by its own 
constitutional framework for which the Court is no longer an 
international tribunal, but rather a constitutional actor at the center of 
European legal evolution.50 In contrast to such a view, scholars have 
characterized the CJEU as a constitutional as well as administrative 
jurisdiction 51  through which the dialogue with a wide variety of 
international courts and international organization characterizes the 
global reach of EU law. 52 
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum the Court has a slimmer 
docket, a reformed architecture and it has shown new interpretative 
guidance especially in the area of international investment with the 
opinion of UK advocate general Eleanor Sharpston, 53  or the 
interpretation of international free trade agreements potentially having 
third party effects beyond the contracting parties.54 Because of this 
awareness of its global role, the minimalist Luxembourg judicial style 
appears more functional to maintain the interplay between law and 
diplomacy,55 thus serving a strategic purpose rather than reflecting a 
civil law outlook. Caught by the Brexit dilemma of a UK that should 
be at the same more inward looking but aspire to a global influence, 
British courts will no longer be in direct dialogue with Luxembourg but 
will continue to closely monitor the jurisprudence of the CJEU. 
III. HOW THE LUXEMBOURG JUDICIAL STYLE HAS CHANGED 
AFTER THE UK ACCESSION 
With the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom 
in 1973, the predominance among civil law traditions was no longer 
the status quo in Luxembourg with the entrance of common law and 
Scandinavian legal systems in the Community. The influence of the 
common law style began showing its effects in the CJEU’s more 
                                                                                                                                     
49. GIUSEPPE MARTINICO & ORESTE POLLICINO, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN EUROPE’S 
LEGAL SYSTEMS: JUDICIAL DIALOUGE AND THE CREATION OF SUPRANATIONAL LAWS 227 
(2012) (citing Bin and Fabbrini) 
50. See Weiler, supra note 34. 
51 . PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE AND THE 
NATION-STATE (2010). 
52. ELAINE FAHEY, THE GLOBAL REACH OF EU LAW (2016). 
53. See Sharpston Opinon 2/15 on Singapore- EU Free Trade Agreement 
54. See Council v. Front Polisario, Case C-104/16P, 2016 E.C.R. 677. 
55. See Mikael Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme European Court: The 
European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of International and National Law and 
Politics, 32(1) LAW AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 137-159 (2007). 
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careful analysis of its own precedents, which by the 1980s, were also 
of greater number.56 In asserting the influence of precedent in famous 
cases such as “Buy Irish”57 and through expressions such as “as the 
Court repeatedly held,”58 the use of the common law tradition was also 
a strategy to assert the legitimacy and coherence of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, showing to a newcomer (the Republic of Ireland in that 
case) that even advertising measures promoted by a private body could 
fall under the restrictions of Article 34 TFEU. 
The UK legal system through its barristers, advocate generals, 
judges and civil servants now into the Community institutions managed 
to influence the Luxembourg’s procedure. For instance, UK lawyers 
were advocating in favor of expanding the rights of parties, such as in 
the infringement procedure that the Commission can bring before the 
Court against the member states under Article 258 TFEU. Throughout 
the Commission’s proceedings, states are considered litigants with 
procedural rights of notification and information rather than “a sinner 
who ought to repent.”59  As a result, the Court held that when the 
Commission fails to fulfill an essential procedural requirement, such 
defect will taint the judgment in favor of the state.60 
The UK style in Luxembourg became more prominent through the 
opinions of its advocate generals, such as the half-French Jean-Pierre 
Warner (1973-81) then Francis G. Jacobs (1988-2006) replaced by 
Eleanor Sharpston (2007-present), the first UK woman to take this 
position. It is worth noticing that historic UK judges such as Alexander 
Mackenzie Stuart (1973-1988) and David Edwards (1992-2004) were 
both Scottish; not by chance the government had named Scottish judges 
coming from a hybrid legal system resenting both civil and common 
law influences. 
For instance, the role of A.G. Jacobs was central with respect to 
the protection of individuals through an effective judicial review that 
ensures the observance of the rule of law the CJEU did not fully change 
                                                                                                                                     
56. See Tridimas, supra note 37. 
57. See Case 249/81, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1982 E.C.R. 4005. 
58 . See Thijmen Koopmans, The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal 
Traditions, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 504 (1991)(citing Case 113/80, Comm’n v. Ireland, 1981 
E.C.R. 1625, 1639). 
59. See Tim Koopmans, The Court of Justice and National Legal Traditions, in LA COUR 
DE JUSTICE DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES 1952–2002: BILAN ET PERSPECTIVES; ACTES 
DE LA CONFÉRENCE ORGANISÉE DANS LE CADRE DU CINQUANTIE ME ANNIVERSAIRE DE LA 
COUR DE JUSTICE 15, 22 (2004). 
60. See Comm’n v. Germany, Case C-431/92, 1995 E.C.R. I-2189, ¶ 45. 
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this aspect of its jurisprudence.61 The tension, however, arose around 
the narrow avenue in judicial review for individuals to challenge 
general measures became clear with the 1998 Greenpeace case, in 
which the environmental organization was denied standing, and led to 
the subsequent opinion delivered by advocate general Francis Jacobs 
in the UPA case,62 now a classic among EU lawyers,63 advocating a 
flexible approach in the interpretation of the test for standing, without 
departing from the notion that individual concern would fully protect 
individual rights.64 
Despite a short-lived victory when the opinion was adhered to by 
the General Court, the Court of Justice ultimately rejected advocate 
general Jacobs’s expansive interpretation.65 As a result, when there is 
no remedy for private individuals, the Court “puts the onus on the 
national courts to do all they can to create one.”66 Jacobs also noted that 
his opinion stirred a vigorous debate, not only among academics, but 
also in relation to the new drafting of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the new 
formulation of Article 263(4) TFEU did not create a smoother avenue 
for individual applicants. Rather, because of a slip in the wording of 
the Lisbon Treaty, it required further judicial interpretation, ultimately 
causing the CJEU to hold that judicial review of “regulatory acts” is 
nearly precluded for private applicants.67 
Under the influence of UK lawyers and judges in favor of having 
more of an adversarial and oral character to the litigation in 
Luxembourg,68 the CJEU reformed its oral procedure, allowing judges 
                                                                                                                                     
61. See Angela Ward & Locus Standi, Under Article 230(4) of the EC Treaty: Crafting a 
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62. See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, Case C-50/00 P, 2002 E.C.R. I-06677, 
¶¶ 59–72. 
63. See Catherine Barnard, Studying EU Law: A Law Student’s Guide, EU LAW ANALYSIS 
(Oct. 2016), http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/p/studying-eu-law-catherine-barnard.html 
64. See Rosa Greaves, Commentary on Selected Opinions of Advocate General Jacobs, 29 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 690, 712–14 (2006). 
65. See Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, Case C-50/00 P, ¶¶ 41–45 (deferring to member 
states the creation of a system of legal remedies and procedures that ensure the right to effective 
judicial protection). 
66. See Francis G. Jacob, Effective Judicial Protection of Individuals in the European 
Union, Now and in the Future, in THE TREATY OF NICE AND BEYOND 335 (Mads Andenas & 
John Usher eds., 2003). 
67. See Roberto Mastroianni & Andrea Pezza, Access of Individuals to the European 
Court of Justice of the European Union Under the New Text of Article 263, ¶ 4, TFEU, 5 
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 923 (2014). 
68 . R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND 
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). 
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to entertain possible hearings of submissions from interested parties 
and, if appropriate, from the advocate general.69 This change was not 
favored by all judges or advocate generals coming from a legal tradition 
in which oral hearings are not crucial to their deliberation and might 
only lengthen the time of the procedure in Luxembourg.70 
In exceptional cases, the Court could even reopen a case for oral 
arguments if it had a sense that a decision could not be made without a 
full discussion of the issues at stake.71  Such oral hearings are not 
always a pleasant experience for civil law judges, advocate generals 
and lawyers in Luxembourg; at times, they lengthened the procedure 
or augmented confusion, instead of providing clarity to the case.72 
However, the oral procedure shaped the legal culture in a way that 
enabled Luxembourg to coagulate its dialogue with the bar and to 
require that lawyers be prepared to engage judges in discussion. 
Some advocate generals, not surprising the UK ones, take more 
advantage of this oral discussion than other, to better understand the 
factual circumstances of each case and their distributive consequences. 
For instance I have argued elsewhere that A.G. Sharpton’s common 
law background made her more sensitive to these types of 
considerations especially when EU law could impact the powers and 
resources of differently situated groups.73 
IV. ACT I: THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE CHALLENGE 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE  
The fact that the UK would join the European Economic 
Community (ECC) was already raising some concerns in the Brussels 
circles in the early 1960s. The UK applied twice to become a member 
of the EEC and both applications in 1961 and 1967 under Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson were vetoed by French President Charles de 
Gaulle worried that UK membership could weaken the community and 
                                                                                                                                     
69. See Transocean Marine Paint Ass’n v. Comm’n, Case 17/74, 1974 E.C.R. 1063 (the 
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enhance the influence of the United States on Europe. Finally in 1973 
the conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath took the UK into the 
Community with the strong support of the Confederation of British that 
published several industrial appraisals showing how the benefits to join 
the community outweighed the costs. When the opposition Labor 
leadership came back into power with the mild socialism of Harold 
Wilson, he launched a referendum that confirmed with over 65% in 
1975 the continued membership of the UK to the Community.74 
Another concern was the fact that the UK was after WWII a 
reluctant European country, 75  and even more worrisome was the 
different legal culture. This was based on two central premises: on the 
one principle of parliamentary sovereignty entailing the constant 
although formalist dialogue between courts and parliament and the 
other was the common law style foreign among the six founding 
members of the ECC. In particular, the common law style entailed both 
stylistic and legal reasoning differences in judicial law making 
including the binding use of precedents, stare decisis, the wide-use of 
facts, an open engagement with policy considerations and the textual 
interpretation of statutes avoiding manufactured interpretations by 
judges based on the legislative history of the statutes. In the absence of 
a constitution, English judges were striving to a “work-fidelity” in the 
interpretation of statutes, keen to look at facts to induce their legal 
reasoning while constrained by their own legal precedents. 76  The 
common law remained highly formulaic and, despite its medieval writ 
system has been eliminated this model left in place procedural 
restraints and guarantees through which the presentation of legal claims 
or legal defenses became central to protect individual rights.77 
Once the Crown had ratified the treaty of accession it was clear 
among lawyers in the Commission, the Assembly and in the UK that 
Community law could become English law treated as such by English 
courts only with an Act of Parliament due to the limited powers of the 
Crown to sign the Treaty of Rome in the dualist UK legal system. In an 
explanatory memorandum the Commission explained how without the 
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Act of Parliament there was a twofold problem: some of the Treaty 
articles would not have had self-executing effect, national courts could 
have not referred preliminary references to Luxembourg based on 
Article 177 and regulations would have had to be implemented by an 
Act of Parliament thus foregoing the annulment proceeding before 
European institutions in Luxembourg. 78  Even though the Act of 
Parliament could [insert] some of the legal implications of the UK 
accession the central principle that remained a problem was the notion 
of parliamentary sovereignty. 
This notion implied that without a constitution Parliament is 
completely “unfettered and free to make or unmake any law it wishes.” 
Such doctrine lead to two distinct and interrelated problems for 
Community law, first was the fact that if parliamentary sovereignty 
could not bind its successors there was no statute of such nature that 
could not be repealed later by a simple Act of Parliament. Second, 
courts were bound to give effect to Parliamentary sovereignty so that 
any subsequent act of parliament contrary to previous inconsistent 
legislation meant an implied repeal of the earlier statute.79  
In practice, however, the British legal system provided some 
escamotages especially with respect to international Treaty obligations 
for which a parliamentary convention provided that “the Parliament 
must not pass legislation which is inconsistent with the treaty 
obligations of the United Kingdom” otherwise such Act would be 
illegal and even if adopted, would have to be enforced by domestic 
courts. Paradoxically, in order to respect the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, a praxis rather than a statute, created a presumption that 
Courts were bound to the textual interpretation even of an illegal 
statute.80 
Since 1962 the Legal Service of the Commission had organized 
different meeting to have the opportunity of discussing with British 
lawyers about some of the fundamental problems they envisaged in the 
EEC accession. At the center of their concerns there was the same need 
to reconcile parliamentary sovereignty and the need of an enabling 
legislation by the Parliament of the Treaties and Community regulation 
to make these self-executing. Yet even more pressing was the question 
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of judicial hierarchy in the UK and the new role to be played by the 
Court of Justice vis à vis English courts: 
In General the British lawyers were anxious to ascertain to what 
extent the judicial remedies available and the procedure before the 
Court of Justice differ from the practice and standards of the 
English judicial system. In particular the British lawyers assessed 
the vital importance of a uniform interpretation of the Community 
law by the Court of Justice, as provided by the EEC Treaty Art 
177.81 
Due to these concerns, the Commission was eager to mobilize the 
UK bar and in a second report in June 1962 the Legal Services had a 
meeting at the Europa Institute at Leyden, this time also with members 
of the bench, practicing lawyers and academics. Similar problems 
were raised at this second meeting with respect how to reconcile the 
UK rule of recognition of parliamentary supremacy and also how to 
maintain the traditional judicial hierarchy of their legal system: 
British lawyers were particularly anxious to clarify the meaning of 
the court of law instance as provided for by Article 177, paragraph 
3. […] Generally the British lawyers seemed to favor in one way 
or another the view that for all practical purposes the Court of 
Appeal should be considered as the Court of last instance.82 
The breakthrough, however, was that not only problems but 
possible solutions were presented on how to reconcile the English legal 
system with Community law. Even though the Parliament would adopt 
a law transposing the Rome Treaty several conflicts were bound to arise 
between Community and UK law that will be solved either by the 
legislatures or by the court. Bound by the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy the majority of British lawyers anticipated having the 
legislature, rather than the courts through litigation, resolve the 
possible conflicts. The solution presented was that the Parliament 
would draft additional legislation “clearing up such conflicts” 83 
between the Treaties and UK law, and in case of future regulation this 
could be timely informed by the government so “it could prepare the 
necessary modification to the English law.”84 
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The solution found to the parliamentary sovereignty dilemma in 
1962, was according to Norman Marsh a legal fiction to avoid 
recognizing a partial surrender of parliamentary sovereignty and let the 
post-accession legal system in a state of legal uncertainty: 
The difficulty here would be practical. It would place an heavy 
burden on judges, they would have to decide how much of our law 
was inconsistent with the Treaty and therefore, by implication, 
repealed. They would have to interpret a Treaty to which this 
country was originally not a party and which was drafted in 
languages other than English; […] What is more, the law would 
be left for a long time in a great state of uncertainty, and those 
unfortunate guinea-pigs, the litigants, would be put to trouble and 
expense in order to provide the cases on which the judges could 
give their rulings.85 
This fictional solution, in support of parliamentary sovereignty 
with the exceptional role of Community law, also reappeared in 
Wilson’s speech at the House of Common in 1967 explaining that: 
[a]ccession to the Treaties would involve passing the United 
Kingdom legislation. This would be an exercise of course, of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, and it is important to realize that 
Community law existing and future, would derive its force as law 
in this country form that legislation passed by Parliament. It would 
be implicit in our acceptance of the Treaties that the United 
Kingdom would, in future refrain from enacting legislation 
inconsistent with Community law.86 
Even though such legal fiction was central to the UK for the 
purpose of the accession, this argument was later used to fuel the 
resistance against Brussels. For instance in 1978 in an infringement 
procedure initiated by the Commission, Commission v. UK, the new 
Labor government in upholding the labor union interests expressly 
denounced a transport safety regulation adopted by the prior 
government that burdened lorry drivers with unnecessary and 
expensive safety features. In this context, labor secretary of Transport 
Rodgers openly addressed newspapers explaining that Community 
harmonization provisions were not binding on the UK since these were 
not laws adopted by parliament.87 
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The European Court of Justice reiterated that Member States were 
prohibited to apply provisions of Community law in an incomplete or 
selective manner, effectively annulling the aspects of Community 
legislation it opposes or deems contrary to national interests.88 The 
court further noted that even implementation difficulties cannot 
preclude Members to opt out of fulfilling its obligation.89 The court 
pronounced that a Member States’ failure in the duty of solidarity 
undermines Community legal order.90 
V. ACT II: IS PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN DANGER? THE 
RESISTANCE TO PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN BRITISH 
COURTS 
One of the characteristics of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as the Hartian rule of recognition of the British judicial 
style is that courts are not to go beyond the plain meaning of 
Westminster’s statutes. Thus legal change, with some important 
exceptions in the common law, albeit limited by precedents, occurs 
slowly, and legislative law reforms are the preferred avenues of 
reform.91  In 1962 when the Commission’s legal services began its 
meeting with British lawyers they were adamant that a central problem 
of the accession was statutory interpretation because: 
In their statutory construction English courts avail themselves in 
many instances of a literary interpretation, disregarding entirely 
the intention of the law-makers as expressed for example by 
hearings, various drafts or “Travaux préparatoires”. […] 
Following his rule of statutory construction an English judge 
might interpret a Treaty provision in an entirely different manner 
from his Continental colleagues.92 
Despite the predominant use of the plain meaning rule by English 
courts, some well-known judges like Lord Denning on the Courts of 
Appeal, were in favor of adopting, instead, a purposive interpretation 
that was less formalistic and open to the scope and goals of a statute in 
question. 93  Even though the Court has done very little use of the 
travaux préparatoires and according to a traditional view these have 
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played little importance in its interpretation until the mid-1990s,94 
others have pointed at this change in treatment in the use of the 
traveaux as among other reasons the prominence of a Scandinavian 
legal tradition in Luxembourg. Yet with the increasing use of the 
travaux not only by the AGs95 but also by the Court itself in recent 
judgments such as Pringle or Gauweiler has to be carefully analyzed 
as some scholars have explained “Reference to the drafters’ intent does 
not necessarily support dynamic interpretation, and may potentially 
even ossify historical interpretations.”96 
For instance, Lord Denning explained that when faced with a 
legislative gap the judge must: 
 “set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of 
Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the 
statute, but also from consideration of the social conditions which 
gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, 
and then he must supplement the written word so as to give ‘force 
and life’ to the intention of the legislature.”97 
The Luxembourg court since the 1960s in some of its iconic cases 
such as Van Gend or Costa had relied on a heterodox approach in which 
judges used literal and historical interpretations as well as teleological 
and comparative interpretations.98 The possible reconciliation between 
Luxembourg’s teleological and comparative interpretation of the 
Treaty and the UK’s plain meaning approach, was through the use of 
the purposive interpretation advocated by Lord Denning. While this 
could create a strategic alliance between Lord Denning’s followers and 
Luxembourg, by the same token it could also trigger enormous 
resistance from the judges bound by textual interpretation of English 
law.99 
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Lord Denning had already expressed clearly that the new Treaty, 
just like an “incoming tide” would produce a large transformation of 
English law that would require new effort from lawyers and judges to 
learn from a new system.100 Lord Denning on the Court of Appeal 
managed to convince others about the necessity of a purposive 
interpretation to address the new challenge:  
What a task is… set before us. The treaty is quite unlike any of the 
enactments to which we have become accustomed. The draftsmen 
of our statutes have striven to express themselves with the utmost 
exactness. They have tried to foresee all possible circumstances 
that might arise and provide for them. […] How different is this 
Treaty! It lays down general principles. It expresses its aims and 
its purposes. All in sentences of moderate length and 
commendable style. But it lacks precision.101 
Lord Denning brought two interesting battles that show both the 
acceptance and the resistance to an openly purposive interpretation of 
UK law in light of the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 
With respect to the acceptance pattern Lord Denning was adamant 
about the fact that UK judges, when interpreting Community law, 
should embrace teleological interpretation: 
They must divine the spirit of the Treaty and gain inspiration from 
it. No longer must they examine the words in meticulous detail. If 
they find a gap they must fill it as best they can. They must do 
what the framers of the instrument would have done if they had 
thought about it. So we must do the same.102 
The differences between the members of the Court of Appeal 
became clear in Macarthys LtD v. Smith when Lord Denning favored a 
teleological approach to article 119 EEC to expand the reach of the 
Equal Pay Act of 1970 limiting equal pay to men and women in 
contemporaneous employment situations. By moving away from the 
plain meaning of the statute, Lord Denning interpreted the broad and 
subsequent principle of the Treaty of Rome as stating that equal pay for 
men and women should be applied to both contemporaneous and 
successive employment. Due to the difference in visions with two other 
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members of the Court of Appeal more inclined to follow Lord 
Mildew’s dictum forbidding the use of legislative history or “no 
English judge looks under the bed,” 103  the case was referred to 
Luxembourg. 
The European Court of Justice undeniably concurred with Lord 
Denning’s interpretation showing that the English textual interpretation 
to Community law would run out especially if Luxembourg was the 
final arbiter.104 In this sense teleological interpretation also served as 
an incentive for progressive lawyering when solicitors and barristers 
alike understood that through the preliminary rulings they could win 
cases for which English courts were still bound to the plain meaning of 
statutes105 and would not likely interpret antidiscrimination directives 
by expanding the rights of their plaintiffs.106 
With respect to the resistance to Community law, judges had 
learned from McCarthy that purposive interpretation found a powerful 
ally in Luxembourg and that this was the final arbiter for community 
law if the UK court referred the preliminary questions. In a series of 
cases in the late 1970s when the Court of Appeal was asked to interpret 
norms on the harmonization of trans-continental road transport that 
were not Community norms but part of a European Treaty, Lord 
Denning together with other four judges argued in favor of a 
teleological interpretation. The House of Lords rejected such invitation 
due to a lack of authority coming from the parliament. Lord Dilhorne 
held “[t]o base our interpretation… on some assumed, and unproved, 
interpretation which other courts are to be supposed likely to adopt, is 
speculative as well as masochistic.”107 
The purposive interpretation of English law in light of the general 
principles of Community law had empowered some judges yet it was 
clear that for others it provided a dangerous avenue that could put in 
danger the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. 
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VI. ACT III: THE EROSION OF PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY 
THROUGH PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
Another challenge to the UK legal system that the lawyers 
addressed in 1962 when discussing with the Commission’s Legal 
Services was the challenge of preliminary reference requiring the 
uninform interpretation of EU law.108 Their starting point was that 
Community law should be treated merely like an act of Parliament thus 
its interpretation required very little assistance from Luxembourg.109 
UK lawyers were very anxious to clarify the meaning of a court of last 
instance for the purpose of Art 177, 3 ECC (267 TFEU) requiring a 
court of last instance to refer a case to Luxembourg. Since an appeal 
was exercised as a privilege rather than a right, British lawyers were 
puzzled by which court should be considered the Court “against whose 
decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law.” 110 As the 
Commission explained they generally agreed that the Court of Appeal 
should be considered such court for the purpose of Art 177 with the 
result of empowering such Court to determine the interpretation and 
validity of Community acts. 111  
A different group of lawyers argued instead that:  
Legislation should designate a higher English court to which all 
English court, irrespective of their instance, would be obliged to 
submit any such preliminary question. This court itself would then 
determine which preliminary questions should be submitted to the 
Court of Justice.112 
Clearly the ability of lower courts to trigger directly and without 
centralized supervision the preliminary reference procedure before the 
European Court of Justice was something that neither groups even 
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considered in 1962. These documents highlight the revolutionary role 
of the ECJ for the UK judicial hierarchy enabling through the 
preliminary reference a direct dialogue between lower courts and 
Luxembourg.   
The centralizing approach to preliminary references expressed by 
UK lawyers was a way to make sure that parliamentary supremacy 
would not be challenged by every single judge who could open UK 
legislation to the review of the ECJ. Yet the justification to such 
centralization was to avoid “frivolous requests,” achieve more uniform 
references to facilitate the work of the ECJ, and create a UK court with 
greater knowledge and experience about preliminary questions. Such 
Court maintaining the monopoly of preliminary references could have 
even the power to refer questions ex-officio if the parties didn’t raise 
them and if is this was decisive for the resolution of the case at hand.113 
The preliminary reference was a sticky issue that even in an 
official note by the United Kingdom it was clear that ought to be 
resolved in a technical way by lawyers without upsetting the two legal 
systems. In Mathew’s report to the parliamentary Assembly he stressed 
the need to draft specific legislation by the parliament in conjunction 
with judges and practicing barristers and solicitors specifying in detail 
“at what point in the proceeding, and on what conditions, and by what 
procedure such a reference could be made. Rules would also be 
required in this respect for the County Courts.” 114  Even though 
politicians made great efforts to ensure that there would be 
parliamentary control on the way preliminary questions would go to 
Luxembourg, the self-restrain came first of all from the legal culture of 
the judiciary that had internalized the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy. 
In fact, the resistance of English courts to opening the floodgates 
to refer preliminary questions to Luxembourg was well entrenched 
until the House of Lords in the 1980s reassured English courts on 
seeking and accepting the guidance of the European Court of Justice.115 
Almost a decade later, the House of Lords in Factortame116 reassured 
British courts about the notion of primacy of Community law and their 
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duty to repeal any national legislation that was in direct conflict with a 
rule or principle of Community law. 
Due to the British legal culture, Article 177: 
“served as an effective escape-valve for British courts [and . . . ] 
the European Court’s decisions usually leave little discretion to the 
courts of the member states. The importance of this outlet is 
demonstrated not only by the circumstances under which the 
British courts use it but by the difficulties they face when the 
European Court’s response is insufficiently precise to provide the 
desired clear rule.”117  
For instance in Barber118 both the Industrial and the Appeal Tribunals 
rejected the claim of Mr. Barber claiming discrimination against its 
female counterparts that could receive immediate pensions at a younger 
retirement age. When the Court of Appeal finally referred the case to 
Luxembourg asking whether pensions could be considered as “pay” 
and thus controlled by ART 119 EEC, the ECJ replied in the affirmative 
in relying on its famous Defrenne judgment. Yet the ECJ discussed the 
temporal effect of the case in order to allow some leeway to national 
courts to limit the retroactive effect of this decision due to the huge 
financial implications for the British pension system.119 
Cases like Barber show how the notion of parliamentary 
sovereignty was in fact being eroded as British courts, even lower ones, 
were becoming more successful in using preliminary references. In 
posing the preliminary questions to Luxembourg “the British judiciary 
has been able to avoid what on some occasions would otherwise be an 
almost explicit policymaking role. Such a task would have been 
impossible to reconcile with their formal tradition.” 120  Yet what 
remained challenging for British courts was not so much applying, in 
almost a mechanical way, the guidelines provided by Luxembourg, but 
rather when the ECJ was not clear and increasingly left hard case or 
proportionality analyses to be done by local courts. 
The Luxembourg technique to ask national courts to apply the test 
elaborated in a very contested issue back home, even though was stroke 
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of genius of ECJ not to meddle with domestic issue, became a huge 
problem back home. This was the case of the Sunday trading saga that 
began with the Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc when two parallel 
importers challenged the 1983 Shops Act as a restriction of the free 
movement of goods and Article 30 EEC (34 TFEU). After a long and 
convoluted judicial battle the only solution came when, on a second 
referral from the House of Lords asking a clear question, it obtained a 
clear answer from the ECJ that Article 30 EC’s prohibition did not 
apply to domestic retailers from allowing them to keep their shops open 
on Sundays. 121  Many other countries faced a similar problem in 
applying correctly Luxembourg’s rulings, especially when striking a 
balance between free movement and social rights protected at the local 
level. For instance, the Sunday trading case triggered a decade of 
domestic litigation in England. As some have explained this was due, 
at the same time, to the manipulation of the preliminary reference by 
the Sunday traders as well as the misunderstanding of the ECJ 
proportionality test by British administrative judges.122 
Preliminary references to Luxembourg liberated UK courts from 
the plain meaning of statutory interpretation, allowing UK courts to 
become policy innovators vis-à-vis judicial interpretation. 123 
Preliminary references allowed lower courts to ask ex-officio a 
preliminary question to Luxembourg in the hope of a mechanical 
application of the ECJ ruling to the case at hand. This became central 
to British lawyers in their advocacy for greater equality in the 
interpretation of antidiscrimination provisions. Cases like Colman 
show that in broadening the scope of an anti-discrimination directive 
by extending it to a woman whose son suffered a disability this proved 
to be a successful lawyering strategy driven by a creative solicitor 
rather than disabilities rights NGOs.124 
Even though the Court of Appeal did not become a centralized 
system as the early British politicians were hoping this would become 
a gate keeper for preliminary references, the High Court became much 
more at ease with a European, purposive and teleological interpretative 
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style. The approach of the Court of Appeal as highlighted by Levitsky 
shows that it “reflects a European-style search for deep underlying 
purpose that goes beyond the positivistic language with which these 
decisions are framed. The search for legislative purpose is necessarily 
a far less determinative endeavor than the traditional British focus on 
plain meaning.”125 
The common use of purposive interpretation together with an ex-
officio use of preliminary references by British courts raised among 
politicians fears of gouvernement des judges transforming the doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty into a legal fiction aiming to hide the 
erosion of Westminster’s absolute law making authority. 
VII. ACT IV: PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY REINSTATED: 
HOW MILLER SAVES THE DAY 
On January 24, 2017 the British Supreme Court decided from an 
Appeal of the Divisional Court of England and Wales the Miller case 
to answer the question posed by the plaintiffs on whether the 
Government was able to trigger unilaterally Article 50 of the TEU and 
in particular the formal notice of withdrawal from the Union without 
the approval of the Parliament.126 
The majority opinion is written by eight of the eleven justices of 
the Supreme Court, three of which wrote the dissenting opinion. At the 
core of the decision there is the question of whether the prerogative to 
terminate a Treaty lies with the executive and the Secretary of State 
who does not have the power to change UK domestic law that remains 
a prerogative of an Act of Parliament.127 In answering this question the 
majority reappraised first the relationship between the UK and the EU 
from 1971 to 2016, putting emphasis on the 1972 European 
Communities Act by Parliament that followed the UK accession to the 
EEC in 1973. Without the Parliament’s Act the court holds that in a 
dualist system the Accession Treaty would not have been binding in 
national law unless it was formally ratified by the legislature.128 
The second move of the Court is to reaffirm through the UK 
constitutional background the principle of parliamentary sovereignty 
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as a limitation on both the Royal Prerogative of the Crown with the 
development of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. By the 
same token, the majority explains that the independence of the judiciary 
is not unbound but constrained in the courts’ discretion and freedom 
they enjoy in the common law by parliamentary statutes.129 Here the 
majority even mentions Professor Dicey’s statement that “no person or 
body is recognized by the law of England as having a right to override 
or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”130 
So here is the hard task for the majority to justify: what happened 
during almost forty years of membership when Courts were asked to 
set aside UK law in name of the primacy and direct effect of 
Community law? But the majority explains: 
It is also true that EU law enjoys its automatic and overriding 
effect only by virtue of the 1972 Act, and thus only while it 
remains in force. That point simply reflects the fact that Parliament 
was and remains sovereign: so, no new source of law could come 
into existence without Parliamentary sanction - and without being 
susceptible to being abrogated by Parliament. However, that in no 
way undermines our view that it is unrealistic to deny that, so long 
as that Act remains in force, the EU Treaties, EU legislation and 
the interpretations placed on these instruments by the Court of 
Justice are direct sources of UK law.131 
The way through which the majority justifies the survival of 
parliamentary supremacy is through a rather traditional dualist 
restatement of constitutional law. 132  According to this vision, the 
content of rights and duties introduced with the 1972 Act is a matter 
for EU law, whereas the constitutional processes by which UK law is 
made is a pure matter of domestic law. 133  A final metaphor, the 
“conduit pipe,” helps this formalist interpretation presented by the 
majority to explain how in forty years politicians and courts could 
maintain such dualist vision between EU and domestic law: 
In our view, then, although the 1972 Act gives effect to EU law, it 
is not itself the originating source of that law. It is, as was said on 
behalf of the Secretary of State echoing the illuminating analysis 
                                                                                                                                     
129. Id. at ¶ 42. 
130. Id. at ¶ 43. 
131. Id. at ¶ 61. 
132. Thomas Poole, Legitimacy, Rights and Judicial Review, 25(4) OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 697 (2005) (paper by Tom Poole on the divisional court case). 
133. See Miller, supra note 16, at 62. 
2017] LUXEMBOURG JUDICIAL STYLE 1533 
of Professor Finnis, the “conduit pipe” by which EU law is 
introduced into UK domestic law. So long as the 1972 Act remains 
in force, its effect is to constitute EU law an independent and 
overriding source of domestic law.134 
This balanced decision by the Supreme Court reinstates the full 
parliamentary supremacy and it is contrasted by Lord Reed’s dissent, 
arguing that a mere notification of withdrawal under article 50 TFEU 
together with its negotiation falls squarely under the prerogative power 
of the Court, advised by its Ministers that was not altered by the 1972 
Act.135 
VIII. CONCLUSION: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE LUXEMBOURG 
JUDICIAL STYLE AFTER BREXIT 
 
After the outcomes of the Brexit referendum, some legal 
academics are openly monitoring and exposing the political and 
economic changes that leaving the EU entails for UK citizens.136 This 
public role for scholars and judges has not spared them from being 
called ‘enemies of the people’ or from more violent threats. Michael 
Dougan’s new edited volume calls for scholars’ political and 
professional responsibility to fully engage with the outcomes of Brexit 
because the “UK withdrawal is not just about finding a new relationship 
with the EU. It is also about opening our own legal and political 
systems to processes of far-reaching change.”137 The extent of such 
change is also the topic at the core of this symposium tackling how UK 
law has influenced EU law.138 To better understand the challenges of 
“de-Europeanization,”139 my contribution revamps some of the early 
history of the UK accession showing that the relation between 
continental and common law lawyers was initially tainted by deep 
skepticism and later on by mutual-influence as well as resistance to 
Europeanization. 
                                                                                                                                     
134.  Id. at ¶ 65. 
135.  Id. at ¶¶ 159, 177. 
136. See The Citizen Brexit Observatory, http://ecas.org/services/citizen-brexit-
observatory/. 
137. See Michael Dougan, Editor’s Introduction, in THE UK AFTER BREXIT. LEGAL AND 
POLICY CHALLENGES 1-12, 5 (Michael Dougan ed. 2017). 
138. See Gelter supra p. 1329. 
139. Id. p. 1330. 
1534 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:5 
After a forty years relationship between London and 
Luxembourg, it remains unclear how much the inner workings of the 
CJEU will change by losing their UK members, including three judges 
and one advocate general. Some features of the common law style as 
well as the use of English as a lingua franca in oral conversations have 
transformed, in an irreversible way, the Luxembourg judicial style. By 
the same token, beyond the uncertainties of the Brexit negotiations, 
there is no doubt that the Luxembourg jurisprudence will continue to 
be closely monitored by UK judges and lawyers as to whether it will 
become a foreign law with an indirect impact on their legal system or 
it will continue to be cited as a valid precedent in the UK legal system. 
Yet those UK judges and lawyers that after the initial “incoming 
tide” have internalized a more purposive and teleological style vis à vis 
statutory interpretation will be precluded to refer preliminary 
references to Luxembourg under TFEU 267.140 As Thomas Horsley has 
explained, de-Europeanization will reduce the space created by the 
preliminary reference procedure between UK domestic courts and 
Luxembourg, thus reducing the activism of lower courts that have been 
the engine of policy innovation in areas such as employment 
discrimination and equal treatment law.141 By re-centralizing, under 
traditional judicial hierarchies, the role of lower courts it is unlikely 
that the Withdrawal Act will undermine the freedoms and equality 
guarantees that lawyers and judges alike have achieved through their 
legal struggles both at home and in Luxembourg. 
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